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Abstract 
We analyse the determinants of firm dynamics in developing countries using Argentina 
as an illustrative case. We explain firm entry and exit at the regional level, 
distinguishing three groups of manufacturing activities: low, medium and high tech.  
We find that both region- and sector- specific determinants explain firm dynamics, but 
the impact is not homogeneous across the sectors considered. In particular, for low tech 
industries, there is a need for explanatory variables that proxy for the specificities of 
developing economies (e.g., poverty, informal economy and idle capacity). We also 
find evidence of a core-periphery pattern according to which agglomeration economies 
and previous entries and exits have different effects in core and peripheral regions. 
These results are relevant for policy makers in developing countries, who should take 
into account not only the specificities of such economies, but also the regional 
heterogeneity both in terms of the level of development and industrial composition 
within the country.  
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Resumen 
En este artículo analizamos empíricamente los determinantes de la dinámica 
empresarial en los países en desarrollo, tomando a la Argentina como un caso 
ilustrativo. Explicamos la entrada y salida de empresas a nivel regional, distinguiendo 
tres grupos de industrias: de baja, media y alta tecnología. Encontramos que tanto los 
determinantes regionales como los sectoriales explican la dinámica empresarial, pero 
su impacto no es homogéneo en todos los sectores considerados. En particular, para las 
industrias de baja tecnología, resulta necesaria la inclusión de variables que reflejen las 
especificidades de Argentina como país en desarrollo (por ejemplo, el nivel de pobreza, 
el tamaño del sector informal o la utilización de capacidad ociosa). También 
encontramos evidencia de un patrón centro-periferia, de acuerdo con el cual las 
economías de aglomeración y las entradas y salidas de los períodos previos poseen 
efectos opuestos en la dinámica empresarial de regiones centrales y periféricas. Estos 
resultados son relevantes para los responsables de política en los países en desarrollo, 
quienes deberían tener en cuenta no sólo las especificidades de estos países, sino 
también la heterogeneidad regional en términos de niveles de desarrollo y composición 
industrial al interior del país.  
 
 
Palabras clave: entrada de empresas; salida de empresas; Argentina; modelos para 
variables enteras 
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1. Introduction 
There is an extensive literature on the regional determinants of entry and exit of 
manufacturing firms1. This interest is explained not only by the direct impact that new 
firms have in terms of employment and production, but also by their indirect effects on 
market efficiency, firms´ productivity, innovation and, ultimately, economic growth 
(Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005). However, this research ignores the fact that the 
regional determinants of new firm formation vary among manufacturing industries. 
Thus, following the seminal work of Audretsch and Fritsch (1999), a number of studies 
have taken into account both regional and sectorial dimensions to adequately assess the 
impact of regional characteristics on firm dynamics2. These studies confirm that 
regional factors determining new firm formation do differ between manufacturing 
industries (Carree et al., 2011), and that certain regional conditions may stimulate new 
firm formation in some industries but deter start-ups in others. As a result, certain 
policy instruments may encourage start-ups but not necessarily in the types of 
industries desired by policy makers (Audretsch and Fritsch, 1999). 
Remarkably, studies on the regional and sectorial determinants of firm entry and exit 
are limited to developed countries. This contrasts with the relevance of developing 
countries for the worldwide economy (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2006). More 
precisely, developing countries’ studies either focus on industry (Lay, 2003; Wang, 
2006; Günalp and Cilasun, 2006; Ozturk and Kilic, 2012) or in regional (Naudé et al., 
2008; Santarelli and Tran, 2012; Calá et al., 2015a and 2015b) determinants. Thus, this 
seems to be the first attempt to quantify regional determinants of firm entry and exit in 
different manufacturing industries of a developing country. 
We want to provide useful information for policy makers in developing economies, 
who are interested in designing public policies to promote the emergence of new firms 
(and their survival) all over the country. To that end, we take Argentina as an 
illustrative case, and we explain firm entry and exit at the regional level, distinguishing 
three groups of manufacturing activities: low, medium and high tech. First, we evaluate 
whether sectorial and regional determinants of entry and exit differ between the 
industrial sectors considered. Second, we take into account developing countries´ 
specificities by adding indigenous factors, such as the level of poverty, the size of the 
informal sector, the idle capacity or the regional structural heterogeneity. 
We conclude that firm formation policies in developing countries should be adapted at 
least at three levels. Firstly, our results stress the risks of simply pursuing policies that 
work well in developed countries. On the contrary, entry-promoting policies should 
take into account the aforementioned indigenous factors. Secondly, public policies 
should consider the industrial composition of each region, since the impact of regional 
                                                 
1 As far as we know, it includes Audretsch and Fritsch (1994) in Germany; Armington and Acs 
(2002), Reynolds (1994) and Sutaria and Hicks (2004) in the U.S.; Berglund and Brännäs (2001) 
and Davidsson et al. (1994) in Sweden; Carree et al. (2008), Garofoli (1994) and Santarelli et al. 
(2009) in Italy; Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) in Greece, Keeble and Walker (1994) in the UK; 
Hart and Gudgin (1994) in Ireland; Spilling (1996) in Norway; Tamásy and Le Heron (2008) in 
New Zealand and Reynolds et al. (1994) in several European countries. 
2 These studies are Arauzo-Carod et al. (2007) for Spain; Carree et al. (2011) for Italy; Fotopoulos 
and Spence (1998) for Greece; Fritsch and Falck (2007) for Germany; Nurmi (2006) for Finland 
and Nyström (2007) for Sweden. 
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and sectorial determinants on firm dynamics is not homogeneous across different 
groups of industries. For example, the poverty level or the size of the informal sector 
impact mostly on low tech entries and exits. Finally, we find a core-periphery pattern 
that is relevant for all groups of industries. This suggests that entrepreneurship policies 
for the whole country should not be based on results and experiences taken only from 
the central regions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review the 
empirical literature on the regional determinants of firm entry and exit in both 
developed and developing economies. Then we address why some regional factors may 
have a different impact in developed and developing countries. In the third section we 
describe firm dynamics in Argentina during the period of interest, as well as the data 
set. Section four presents the econometric model and the main results, and section five, 
the final remarks. 
 
2. Determinants of firm entry and exit: theory and evidence 
2.1. Developed countries 
The significant variations in the regional entry and exit patterns have been explained in 
the literature (see footnote 1) by differences in some regional characteristics: a) labour 
markets, b) industrial structure and c) spatial concentration of economic activities and 
individuals3.  
As for the differences in the labour market, the literature has concentrated on the effects 
of unemployment, wages and the educational level of the workforce. Firstly, the 
incidence of unemployment on firm dynamics is ambiguous. According to the “push 
hypothesis”, there is a positive impact of unemployment on firm entry to the extent 
that the unemployed can start a new firm. Similarly, when unemployment increases, 
self-employed individuals face fewer job opportunities and are thus less prone to exit 
(Carree and Thurik, 1996; Nyström, 2007; Carree et al., 2008; Santarelli et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, according to the “pull hypothesis” an increase in unemployment 
may have a negative impact on entry because the unemployed lack entrepreneurial 
abilities and capital. Likewise, since unemployment is a proxy for the level of economic 
activity, an increase in the unemployment rate may result in an increase in the number 
of exits (Brixy and Grotz, 2007). Secondly, a rise in the cost of labour discourages the 
entry of new firms and favours exits (Santarelli et al., 2009). Thirdly, the availability of 
qualified labour may foster the entry of new firms in industries that require these skills4 
(Spilling, 1996).  
As regards the industrial structure, previous studies have focused on the level of 
industrial diversification, the industrial tradition, the share of small and medium-size 
                                                 
3 There are also a number of factors that, while important in explaining firm dynamics, are not easy 
to be included into empirical analyses. This is the case of cultural attitudes towards 
entrepreneurship (Shapero, 1983) and the role of the government, through public spending on 
infrastructure or public policies (Reynolds et al., 1994). 
4 We should have in mind that people with high human capital are better in discovering and 
exploiting business opportunities, but at the same time they are more likely to have well paid jobs, 
so they are not necessarily more prone to start new firms (Nyström, 2007). 
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enterprises (SMEs), and the relationship between entries and exits. A more diversified 
environment promotes both the entry of new firms and their survival, because of the 
higher chances of reallocating resources to new activities when a negative shock occurs 
(Kosacoff and Ramos, 1999). Besides, the industrial tradition may boost current 
entrepreneurial activities (Rocha and Sternberg, 2005), as well as deter firm closures, 
since it is likely that past incumbents have developed a favourable business 
environment and supporting institutions. The share of SMEs is expected to increase 
regional turbulence, since it fosters both entry and exit. On the one hand, entry costs 
are lower in areas with a dense network of SMEs because these firms pay lower wages 
(thus reducing the opportunity cost of self-employment) and serve as role models for 
new entrepreneurs (Audretsch, 1995b; Ashcroft et al., 1991). On the other hand, as 
small firms are more likely to exit due to cost disadvantages, exits should be higher in 
regions with a large proportion of small firms (Fotopoulos and Spence, 1998; Carreira 
and Teixeira, 2011). This is closely related to the relationship between entries and exits. 
Entrances may influence exits by increasing the pressure of competition in the market 
(the so called displacement effect) and, at the same time, firms that abandon the market 
leave behind niches of unsatisfied consumers that encourage new companies to enter 
(the replacement effect). In particular, according to the revolving door phenomenon many 
(small) firms exit only a few years after creation (Audretsch, 1995a). 
In addition, concentrated areas will tend to have more entries and less exits because 
firms benefit from local external economies, such as specialized suppliers, thick labour 
market and technological spillovers, as well as the physical proximity to consumers 
(Armington and Acs, 2002; Fotopoulos and Spence, 1999; Keeble and Walker, 1994; 
Littunen et al., 1998; Reynolds et al., 1994). On the other hand, disagglomeration 
economies may hamper entry and lead to further exit. This is because a higher density 
pushes up input prices by increasing competition for the scare resources.5  
However, the impact of these regional characteristics is likely to differ between 
industries. For example, according to the product life cycle theory (Vernon, 1966) new 
innovative firms in the early stages take more advantage from agglomeration 
economies, since dense urban areas provide better access to capital, skilled labour, 
infrastructure, information and interaction opportunities with other firms. As the 
product matures, new firms compete on the base of lower prices, so they need to lower 
their input costs. Besides, the impact of regional factors such as the income level or the 
unemployment may depend on the elasticity of demand or the level of capital intensity, 
respectively (Audrestch and Fritsch, 1999). Ignoring this kind of differences among 
industries may be the cause of the mixed and partly contradictory results found in the 
literature (Audrestch and Fritsch, 1999; Fritsch and Falck, 2007). 
Only a handful of studies have addressed this limitation (see footnote 2), by considering 
–in addition to regional variables- some industry-specific factors. In particular, these 
                                                 
5 Exits may also be higher in densely populated areas ―see e.g. Buss and Lin (1990), Forsyth (2005) 
and Huiban (2011) for empirical evidence. The reasons for this are several. First, higher 
competition in both goods and factors markets (Agarwal and Gort, 1996; Bresnahan and Reiss, 
1991). Second, higher chances of  finding a job, finding another entrepreneurial opportunity 
and/or selling the firms’ assets to another venture (Huiban, 2011). Third, as discussed below, 
since large urban areas attract more entry, a large share of  young firms may lead to higher exits. 
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studies include barriers to entry and exit to find that the relative importance of location-
specific factors is greater in industries with low barriers (Arauzo-Carod et al., 2007; 
Fotopoulos and Spence, 1998; Fritsch and Falck, 2007; Nurmi, 2006). They also show 
that while for some industries it is more important the demand for the products of that 
industry, other activities depend more on the evolution of the overall (regional or 
national) demand. Also, the impact of the number of incumbents in the same industry 
is ambiguous. On the one hand, they may foster the attraction of similar ventures that 
benefit from positive externalities (the so called localization economies); on the other 
hand, they may exert a competition effect, which prevents entry and increases exit 
(Carree et al., 2011).  
 
2.2. Developing countries 
The empirical evidence on what determines firm entry and exit in developing countries 
is very limited. In particular, Lay (2003) and Wang (2006) for Taiwan and Günalp and 
Cilasun (2006) and Ozturk and Kilic (2012) for Turkey, analyze the entry of new firms 
using industry level data. Calá et al. (2015a), Naudé et al. (2008) and Santarelli and 
Tran (2012) use regional level data for Argentina, South Africa and Vietnam 
respectively. As for the studies concerned with the determinants of exit, these include 
Lay (2003) for Taiwan and Ozturk and Kilic (2012) for Turkey (at the industry level) 
and Calá et al. (2015b) for Argentina (at the regional level).6  
Interestingly, there are several features of developing economies that may affect firm 
dynamics and its determinants, which highlights the need for specific empirical 
research about this topic (Bruton et al., 2008). First, developing countries are generally 
characterised by macroeconomic instability and intense cyclical variations (Stiglitz, 
1998; Ocampo et al., 2009; Bértola and Ocampo, 2012), so that we can expect higher 
vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks. This means that after each crisis a great 
number of firms enter the growing markets, of which an important share will exit in the 
following years, thus producing a “revolving door” phenomenon that can be more 
intense than the one typically observed in developed countries. In addition, after an 
economic crisis existing firms exploiting their idle capacity may be more important 
than new firms in satisfying the demand for new goods (Calá et al., 2015a).  
Moreover, the macroeconomic volatility may mitigate the effect of variables such as the 
unemployment rate or the industrial tradition. On the one hand, long-term unemployed 
individuals may not have the ability, the financial resources and/or the social capital 
needed to start a new business (Fritsch and Falck, 2007). On the other hand, changes in 
the conditions that determine profitability (exchange rate, credit conditions, tax policy, 
etc.) and the lack of continuity in the industrial policies may prevent the consolidation 
of national firms from which new entrepreneurs can emerge (Calá et al., 2015a).  
A less developed industrial structure and less saturated markets may affect the 
relationship between entries and exits. For example, evidence rejecting the replacement 
                                                 
6 There are also several studies that explain firm exit using firm level variables, such as size, age and 
productivity (for instance, Eslava et al., 2006 for Colombia and López, 2006; Álvarez and Görg, 
2009 and Álvarez and Vergara, 2010; 2013 for Chile). 
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effect has been found for Turkey and Taiwan (Günalp and Cilasun, 2006; Lay, 2003). 
Besides, exits may actually reflect negative expectations about the evolution of 
economic activity, deterring entry (Calá et al., 2015a). Similarly, agglomeration does 
not always have a positive association with start-up rates since increased competition 
and higher barriers to entry may act as disincentives for entrepreneurial activity in core 
regions (Naudé et al., 2008). 
Further, the informal sector is usually higher in developing countries (Schneider, 2005). 
At the regional level, the relationship between the size of the shadow economy and the 
entry rate may be either positive or negative. It will be positive if there are 
complementarities via sub-contracting activities or if the informal sector encourages 
entry by acting as a “stepping stone” (Bennett, 2010). That is, entrepreneurs may first 
enter the informal sector to “test the water” before deciding whether or not to enter the 
formal sector. Besides, informality may encourage start-ups since informal jobs are 
usually instable and insecure and, consequently, push people towards entrepreneurship. 
However, the relation will be negative if informal companies compete with formal 
firms on the basis of lower prices and non-differentiated goods. As for the exits, a 
positive relationship may arise if formal firms compete for the same resources than 
informal firms and/or formal firms become informal when facing difficulties. Yet a 
negative association is expected if formal firms buy inputs to the informal sector, thus 
lowering costs and/or increasing flexibility.  
Another distinctive characteristic of developing economies is the high level of poverty 
and income disparity, both among individuals and regions. This may hamper the 
emergence of new (formal) ventures, since the demand for goods and services is 
smaller, unstable and less diverse. Poverty also impacts on the supply of entrepreneurs, 
since the share of people with access to information, business networks and financial 
resources is limited (Hamilton and Harper, 1994; Kantis et al., 2005).  
Lastly, developing countries show marked differences in critical economic indicators 
among their regions, to the extent that some areas can have levels of capitalization, 
technology, productivity and human capital requirements similar to their counterparts 
in advanced countries (Sunkel, 1978). A direct implication of this “structural 
heterogeneity” (Cassiolato et al., 2009) is that firm entry/exit determinants may differ 
across the regions of a country. For example, in peripheral areas there are usually not 
enough related firms to create the conditions required for external economies in some 
sectors, so that positive agglomeration effects are expected to arise only in central areas. 
Previous studies on aggregated entry and exit in Argentina find that the spatial 
distribution of aggregated entries and exits exhibit a core-periphery pattern (Calá et al., 
2015a and 2015b).  
 
2.3. Empirical strategy 
In order to identify which regional characteristics affect firm entry and exit, we 
estimate different equations for the number of entries (and exits) in three groups of 
manufacturing industries: a) low tech; b) medium tech; c) high tech. The general 
formulation of these equations is: 
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ENTRYijt = f(REGIONit; INDUSTRYijt; MACROt)    [1] 
EXITijt = f(REGIONit; INDUSTRYijt; MACROt)      [2] 
 
where REGIONit denotes a group of region-specific factors that vary among years and 
provinces (such as unemployment, regional demand, density or industrial structure); 
INDUSTRYijt refers to sector-specific determinants that vary among provinces, years 
and groups of industries (such as the number of incumbents or exiting firms in the 
sector) and MACROt refers to factors at the national level that may affect firm 
dynamics, which vary only by year.  
In order to test if the determinants of firm dynamics in developed countries are of 
similar importance here, we take as the starting point a set of determinants that are 
generally found to explain regional entry and exit in those economies, both at the 
sectoral and regional level. This provides our first test on the differences between 
developed and developing countries (see e.g. Fritsch et. al., 2006 and Ghani et al., 2014 
for similar strategies). Based on section 2.2, we expect that some variables that explain 
firm entry and exit in advanced countries have either weak statistical significance or 
show the opposite sign. 
Next we add factors, such as the size of the informal economy or the level of poverty, 
that are potentially important in developing countries (and are never considered in 
studies on developed countries). Finally, we explore the existence of a core-periphery 
structure by including the products of a dummy that identifies the richest provinces 
with variables that are expected to have different effects in central and non central 
regions (agglomeration effects and replacement/displacement effects). This is our 
second test on the differences between developed and developing countries. On the one 
hand, we expect that variables that incorporate some of the specificities of developing 
countries have substantial explanatory power. On the other hand, we expect cross 
products to have different effects in core and lagged regions.  
 
3. Data 
3.1. Entry and exit 
Entry and exit data come from the Employment and Business Dynamics Observatory 
(EBDO) of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security of Argentina. The database 
includes information about the number of entries, exits and incumbents based on all 
manufacturing (formal and private) firms with at least one employee registered with the 
Social Security. This means that our data set does not contain information on either 
public or informal employment. Moreover, the EBDO handles changes in firm codes 
that do not reflect true market entries and exits. In general, a firm is considered closed 
when it does not declare employees in the last twelve months. However, spurious exits 
caused by the displacement of the whole firm’s workforce from firms that “exit” to 
become “new” firms are identified and excluded from the database. Lastly, we restrict 
the analysis to manufacturing firms that declare that the major part of their workforce 
is located in the assigned jurisdiction (about 90% of the total firms in 2008). This means 
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that branch offices or subsidiaries located in other jurisdictions are excluded from our 
data set. All in all, this is the most up-to-date, comprehensive, reasonably long-term 
and spatially disaggregated data source currently available for firm demography studies 
in Argentina.   
Data is available for the 23 Argentinean provinces and the Capital Federal city. 
However, Buenos Aires province is actually divided into Gran Buenos Aires and the 
rest of the province. Also, we dropped the province of Río Negro because of missing 
data in most of the explanatory variables we considered. This is why although there are 
25 jurisdictions in the database, we ultimately provide results from only 24. 
Additionally, manufacturing is divided into 23 two-digit industries which are grouped 
into three categories (high-, medium- and low-tech) according to their level of 
technological intensity by using the taxonomy suggested by Katz and Stumpo (2001) 
and adapted to a two-digit disaggregation by Katz and Bernat (2011)7.  
Our dependent variable is the number of annual entries and exits in each jurisdiction 
and group of industries during the period 2003 to 2008. We start our analysis in 2003 to 
avoid the structural break caused by the economic and political crisis of the end of 2001 
that led to the devaluation of the Argentinean peso in January 2002. Including these 
years of turmoil would completely distort results. We finish our analysis in 2008 
because this was the last available year in the EBDO dataset when this investigation 
was initiated. Table 1 shows the evolution of entries, exits and incumbents over the 
period of analysis. 
 
Table 1. Number of entries, exits and incumbents in Argentina (2003 – 2008) 
Year Entry Exit Incumbents 
2003 4,986 2,330 42,754 
2004 5,994 2,326 45,234 
2005 5,486 2,929 48,317 
2006 6,264 3,623 49,987 
2007 5,886 4,358 51,796 
2008 5,389 5,103 52,417 
Source: author from EBDO data 
 
The high values of entries in 2003-2005 are closely related to the recovery of the 
Argentinean economy after the severe crisis of 2001-2002. Table 1 shows that the high 
entry rates in 2003-2005 (around 11%) declined in the following years, but they were 
still high (about 7% in the last two years of our sample). As for the exits, after the first 
two years of stability (2003-2004), they followed the opposite trend, with an average 
yearly-variation rate of 21%. According to the MTEySS (2007), this was largely driven 
by new ventures in the initial years after the crisis (deferred projects along with strictly 
new ventures encouraged by better macroeconomic conditions). Additionally, the 
slowdown in the net entry in 2008 is explained by the international financial crisis, the 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 1. This classification has been adopted by ECLAC and it is largely used in 
Latinamerican studies (ECLAC, 2007). It is based on the resource which is intensively used in 
the production of  goods: natural resources, labour or engineering. It slightly differs from the one 
defined by OCDE. 
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gradual appreciation of the real exchange rate and some internal conflicts (Katz and 
Bernat, 2011).  
Table 2 shows that the spatial distribution of incumbents, entries and exits is not 
homogeneous, since most concentrate on the five richest regions (the Capital Federal 
city, Gran Buenos Aires, the rest of Buenos Aires province, Santa Fe and Córdoba). 
More precisely, these regions roughly cover 22% of the surface of the country but 
concentrate about 80% of the workers, incumbents, new ventures and exiting firms. 
This uneven spatial distribution of the economic activity is quite characteristic of a 
developing economy (Scott and Storper, 2007). 
In addition, the composition of incumbents, entries and exits also differs. In central 
provinces, the relative importance of medium and high tech industries is higher than in 
peripheral regions (Table 2). This is related to the advantages that central provinces 
offer to these kind of activities: these five jurisdictions concentrate 75% of expenditures 
in science and technology, 77% of university degrees, 62% of universities and 85% of 
exports of manufactured products in 2003 (INDEC, 2005). In terms of Feldman (1994), 
the geographic concentration of knowledge inputs forms a technological infrastructure 
that lowers the risks and costs of engaging in activities with higher levels of 
technological intensity.  
Table 2. Incumbent firms, entries and exits by group of manufacturing industries  
in central and peripheral regions (2003-2008) 
 
a. Incumbents by group of industries in central and peripheral regions. 
Average 2003-2008  
  Periphery Centre Periphery Centre 
Low tech 6,534 22,102 74.8% 56.0% 
Medium tech 1,420 9,849 16.3% 24.9% 
High tech 776 7,548 8.9% 19.1% 
Total 8,730 39,500 100.0% 100.0% 
 
b. Firm entry by group of industries in central and peripheral regions. 
Sum 2003-2008 
  Periphery Centre Periphery Centre 
Low tech 5,071 16,805 76.4% 62.2% 
Medium tech 1,113 6,107 16.8% 22.6% 
High tech 454 4,098 6.8% 15.2% 
Total 6,638 27,010 100.0% 100.0% 
     
c. Firm exit by group of industries in central and peripheral regions. 
Sum 2003-2008 
  Periphery Centre Periphery Centre 
Low tech 3,088 10,754 78.3% 65.1% 
Medium tech 576 3,421 14.6% 20.7% 
High tech 279 2,336 7.1% 14.1% 
Total 3,943 16,511 100.0% 100.0% 
Note: figures are population data. 
Source: author (from EBDO data) 
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3.2. Explanatory variables 
We use data from the EBDO and the National Household Survey (NHS) to construct 
our vector of explanatory variables (the size of the provinces in km2 comes from the 
Military Geographical Institute). The distinction is important because the information 
contained in the EBDO database refers to the whole province, while the NHS is 
performed by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) on samples of 
families in 31 urban areas. Nevertheless, we were obliged to use the NHS data because 
there is no statistical source providing yearly information on demographic and/or 
socioeconomic characteristics of the Argentinean provinces (population censuses, for 
example, are performed every 10 years).  
In particular, we were able to construct two types of variables: a) region-specific 
variables related to the evolution of economic activity, the labour market, the level of 
education, the industrial structure and the existence of agglomeration economies; b) 
sector-specific variables that account for the economic conditions that the three groups 
of industries face in the different regions, such as market growth, barriers to entry and 
exit, industrial tradition, agglomeration effects and input prices. As discussed in section 
2, these factors are widely used in studies on developed countries. Moreover, we 
included year dummy variables to control for macroeconomic factors8. 
In a second step, we added variables related to the level of poverty, the informal 
economy and the idle capacity in an attempt to capture the economic and structural 
singularities of a developing country. We have also included the square of the level of 
poverty and informality to account for possible non-linear effects. Lastly, we have 
explored the existence of core-periphery differences by including the products of a 
dummy that identifies the richest provinces with the variables that account for the 
agglomeration effects and the relationship between entries and exits. 
Tables 3 and 4 report the definition, statistical sources and descriptive statistics of the 
explanatory variables. It also contains two columns with the expected sign of the 
associated coefficient, both for entry and exit. Below, we briefly explain how these 
variables were constructed, as well as the expected sign.  
 
                                                 
8 These were preferred to macroeconomic variables such as e.g. the GDP growth because of  the 
measurement problems involved in these aggregates. The GDP growth in local currency is 
inaccurate because official inflation figures are not reliable since 2007 and the GDP growth in 
US dollars is similarly misleading because of  the severe devaluation of  the Argentinean peso in 
2002 (more than 200%) and the consequent gradual appreciation.  
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Table 3. Region-specific explanatory variables: definition, sources, expected signs and descriptive statistics 
Source: author 
Variable Definition 
Sector 
Source 
Expected sign 
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max 
Entry Exit 
Employment variation Rate of variation in employment in all formal firms  
Own calculations from 
EBDO 
+ - 9.22 5.20 -6.97 22.75 
Exit otherst-1 
Number of exits in the previous year in the other 
sectors 
Med-High 
+/-  
43.92 90.17 0 503 
Low-High 109.49 189.11 4 904 
Low-Med 118.08 202.77 4 934 
Entry otherst-1 
Number of entries in the previous year in the other 
sectors 
Med-High 
 +/- 
75.19 150.63 0 771 
Low-High 166.66 285.41 3 1,284 
Low-Med 182.23 311.02 3 1,373 
Incumbent others Number of incumbent firms in the other sectors 
Med-High 
+/- +/- 
813.67 1,685.90 6 8,134 
Low-High 1,531.76 2,545.41 86 10,075 
Low-Med 1,652.79 2,776.12 84 12,005 
HH index Hirschman-Herfindahl Index  - + 24.36 12.00 8.06 62.90 
SMEs 
Ratio of small and medium industrial firms to total 
industrial firms (formal) 
 
+ + 39.92 5.77 27.27 57.03 
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate   
Own calculations from 
NHS* 
+/- +/- 8.19 3.81 1.01 18.20 
Primary education Active individuals with primary education (in 1,000)  +/- +/- 191.36 297.19 7.68 1,554.53 
Secondary education Active individuals with secondary education  (in 1,000)  +/- +/- 281.69 384.37 21.80 1,897.59 
University education 
Active individuals with university-level education (in 
1,000) 
 
+/- +/- 220.44 279.55 12.34 1,032.11 
Density Log (population/area)  (in thousands) 
 Own calculations from  
Military Geographical 
Institute  
and INDEC 
+ - 676.91 2,732.61 0.83 13,739.75 
Private-to-public Private employees/public employees  
Own calculations from 
NHS* 
+  3.32 1.64 1.22 9.14 
Migrants 
Migration from other provinces (number of individuals, 
in thousands) 
 
+  206.16 294.16 29.93 1,506.10 
Poverty % of households below the indigence line  -  8.87 6.15 0.40 29.80 
Non-
registered/registered 
Ratio of non-registered workers to registered workers 
 
+/- +/- 0.81 0.31 0.16 1.51 
* Data refer to 3rd quarter of  every year, except for 2007 (4th quarter). 
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Table 4. Sector-specific explanatory variables: definition, sources, expected signs and descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition Sector Source 
Expected sign 
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max 
Entry Exit 
Incumbents Number of incumbent firms in the sector 
Low 
Own calculations 
from EBDO 
+ - 
1,185.44 1,867.28 80 7,096 
Med. 467.35 994.99 2 5,032 
High 346.32 703.33 4 3,102 
Exitt-1 
Number of exits in the sector in the 
previous year  
Low 
+  
91.82 153.83 3 763 
Med. 26.26 54.18 0 323 
High 17.67 36.81 0 195 
Entryt-1 
Number of entries in the sector in the 
previous year 
Low 
 + 
136.85 229.31 3 1,127 
Med. 45.38 92.65 0 479 
High 29.81 59.66 0 292 
Industrial 
tradition 
Incumbent firms in the sector 7 years ago 
(3-years moving average) 
Low 
+ - 
1,154.14 1,850.12 62.33 7,007.67 
Med. 436.40 950.07 2.67 4,641.33 
High 325.77 674.14 4 2,943.33 
Market growth 
/ Idle capacity 
Rate of variation in employment in 
incumbent firms of the sector 
Low 
+/- - 
6.64 6.97 -22.78 28.79 
Med. 11.88 32.13 -50 350 
High 18.71 62.51 -42.33 725 
Wages 
Nominal wages paid by registered firms in 
the sector 
Low 
. + 
1,532.05 595.47 545.04 3,397.12 
Med. 1,526.54 814.31 366.10 4,782.37 
High 1,944.09 998.10 260.93 6,141.69 
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a) Region-specific variables 
Business cycle. We use the rate of variation of the employment in all formal firms to 
proxy for the evolution of the economic activity. The coefficient of this variable is 
expected to be positive for entries and negative for exits, thus reflecting the 
procyclicality of both processes. We additionally include the (lagged) number of exits 
(and entries) as another proxy of the regional dynamism10.  
Labour. We use the regional unemployment rate to assess the labour market impact on 
firm dynamics. As we previously argued, we cannot say, a priori, what will be its 
impact.  
Education. We use the number of active population with primary, secondary and 
university-level education. We expect that higher educational levels impact mostly on 
high or medium tech activities. 
Spatial concentration. We use population density and its square as proxies for 
agglomeration and disagglomeration economies, respectively. It is expected that the 
density coefficient will be positive for entries, while both positive and negative signs are 
possible for exits. As for the squared, a negative (positive) sign is expected for entries 
(exits). We have also included the number of incumbent firms as an additional measure 
of the agglomeration of economic activity. 
Industrial structure. The industrial structure of the province is approximated using the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH) Index and the share of SMEs. We expect that the HH 
index, which measures lack of diversity, to impact negatively (positively) on entry 
(exit). We also expect that the proportion of SMEs to impact positively on both entry 
and exit.  
Cultural attitudes. We account for the regional cultural differences that may enhance 
start ups by including the ratio private-to-public employees and the number of 
individuals coming from other provinces. We expect both variables to impact 
positively on entry. 
Poverty. We proxy the extent of poverty with the percentage of households below the 
indigence line. This threshold is given by the capacity to afford a basic food basket, 
which is estimated to be about 38 USD per adult in 2003. As we have previously 
argued, less entry is expected in poorer regions because the share of entrepreneurs with 
access to resources is small and the demand is lower and less diverse.  
Informal economy. We use the ratio of non-registered workers to total workers as a 
proxy for the regional productive structure (e.g. the seasonality and/or low 
productivity of certain activities may facilitate the growth of the informal sector) 
and/or the lack of government controls over informal economy. As we have explained, 
both positive and negative signs are possible for this variable.  
                                                 
10 Note that the replacement/displacement effects are accounted for entries and exits in the same group 
of  industries. 
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b) Sector-specific variables 
Previous entry/exit. We use the lagged number of entries (and exits) in the same group 
of industries to account for the interdependence between both processes in the exit 
(entry) equation. We expect that past exit (entry) to impact positively on current entries 
(exits) because of the replacement (displacement) effect. However, its impact may be 
hampered if regional markets are not saturated and, consequently, competition among 
firms is scarce.  
Spatial concentration. We include the number of incumbents in each group of 
industries to proxy for the effects of localization economies and/or the level of 
competition among firms.  
Industrial tradition. We control for the previous industrial activities carried out in a 
province using the average number of incumbents in the same sector 7, 6 and 5 years 
before (3-year centered moving average). Although we expect that past incumbents 
encourage entry and discourage exit, the high macroeconomic volatility may mitigate 
this effect. Thus, the knowledge embedded in a region as a result of past (dynamic) 
localization economies may not have a clear effect due to changes in macroeconomic 
conditions such as the exchange rate, tariffs, credit access or tax policy, as well as the 
lack of continuity in the industrial policies. 
Wages. We use wages in each group of industries to assess the impact of labour cost on 
firm dynamics. They correspond to the average monthly wage of private registered 
workers, in nominal terms because official inflation rates in Argentina are not reliable 
since 200711. We expect a negative (positive) impact of this variable on entries (exits). 
However, its significance may be weak in developing countries because, due the 
limitations of the financial system, many entrepreneurs use their savings for the initial 
capital required (Wang, 2006). 
Market growth/Idle capacity. We use the rate of growth of the employees in each 
group of industries in order to account for the evolution of the sectoral demand. The 
coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive for entries and negative for exits. 
However, the usage of idle capacity by incumbent firms may mitigate this effect. 
 
4. Econometric modeling and empirical results 
Given the definition of our dependent variable, we rely on panel count data models 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Panel data allow us to control for some characteristics of the 
provinces (observable or not) that do not change much across time, as for example, 
endowments of natural resources, institutional setting and entrepreneurial culture. Besides, 
panel data give more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of 
freedom and more efficiency (Baltagi, 2005).  
                                                 
11 Wages in each group of  industries were constructed as a weighted average of  the nominal wages in 
each 2-digit industry, using as weights the share of  each 2-digit industry in the total number of  
incumbents in the group. 
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Panel data models were preferred to cross-section estimates on the grounds of two 
empirical tests. First, likelihood ratio tests on the variance of the individual effects always 
yield statistically significant results, thus rejecting the validity of pooled estimates 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Second, we tested the assumption that observations are 
indeed independent across the considered years by computing the covariance matrix of the 
year vector of Pearson-residuals from the pooled Poisson regression model (see Hausman 
et al., 1984 for details). We found large values in the off diagonal elements of the matrix in 
all the specifications, which supports the independence assumption that sustains panel data 
models.  
In order to choose between Poisson and Negative Binomial models, we computed the ratio 
of the Pearson goodness-of-fit statistic to the degrees of freedom of a Poisson model with 
province dummy variables. As Allison and Waterman (2002) argue, if this ratio is close to 
one, there is no evidence of overdispersion in the data and Poisson estimates are efficient. 
Unfortunately, Negative binomial models did not achieve convergence in the low tech 
entry model. We thus report results from the Poisson model —even though the value of 
the ratio proposed by Allison and Waterman (2002) is slightly above one (1,42). Second, 
our choice between fixed effects and random effects is based on the Durbin-Hu-Hausman 
test. For most models we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the 
covariates and the individual effect, which means that the random effects model yields 
consistent estimates. However, when we reject that hypothesis, we use fixed effects model, 
since they always provide consistent estimates. 
We report these estimates in tables 5 (entry) and 6 (exit). In particular, in Columns [1] we 
report results from the specification that contains variables which are widely used in 
studies on developed countries, while columns [2] include variables that capture the 
specificities of developing countries (poverty, the size of the informal sector and the idle 
capacity), as well as the core-periphery pattern found in Argentina (Calá et al., 2015a and 
2015b). 
Let us first consider results for firm entry (Table 5). The first thing to notice is that results 
for low tech activities, which approximately account for 65% of total entries over the 
period, are largely consistent with those found in previous studies for the whole 
manufacturing (Calá et al., 2015a). This means that the level of regional economic activity, 
the number of individuals with higher education and the share of SMEs impacts positively 
on entries. There are also significant agglomeration and disagglomeration effects driven by 
the concentration of population. Lastly, both the incumbents in the sector and the past 
incumbents show a negative effect on entry. The first effect may be related to more 
"saturated" markets whereas the second suggests that the positive effect of dynamic 
agglomeration economies may be hampered by unstable macroeconomic policies that 
encourage different sectors in a short-time period. 
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Table 5. Determinants of firm entry by group of industries 
    Low tech Medium tech High tech 
    [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] 
    NB FE Poisson RE Poisson RE Poisson RE Poisson RE Poisson RE 
R
eg
io
n-
 s
pe
ci
fi
c 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
us
ed
 in
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 c
ou
nt
ri
es
 
Employment variation 
0.0197*** 0.0270*** 0.0105 0.0063 -0.0161 0.0063 
(0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0100) (0.0104) (0.0151) (0.0140) 
Exit in other sectors t-1 
-0.0007 0.0091** 0.0005 -0.0075** -0.0009* 0.0035 
(0.0005) (0.0039) (0.0004) (0.0029) (0.0006) (0.0029) 
Unemployment rate 
0.0123 -0.0033 -0.0022 0.0037 -0.0162 0.0072 
(0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0170) (0.0178) (0.0204) (0.0163) 
Primary education 
-0.0005 0.0001 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0009 
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Secondary education 
0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0003 
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
University education 
0.0011** 0.0006 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0008 0.0000 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
HH index 
0.0126 0.0064 -0.0037 -0.0059 -0.0092 -0.0177** 
(0.0087) (0.0095) (0.0129) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0074) 
SMEs 
0.0276*** 0.0040 0.0163 0.0045 -0.0026 -0.0342** 
(0.0104) (0.0090) (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0236) (0.0152) 
Density 
4.4403*** 0.6550*** 0.8933** 1.0074*** 0.7769*** 0.9465*** 
(1.6456) (0.1831) (0.3543) (0.2302) (0.2460) (0.1472) 
Density2 
-0.3860** -0.1144*** -0.0588* -0.1649*** -0.1144*** -0.1822*** 
(0.1587) (0.0248) (0.0329) (0.0291) (0.0273) (0.0120) 
Incumbents in other sectors 
0.0001 0.0019 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0011*** 0.0025*** 
(0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
Private/Public 
-0.0315 -0.0114 -0.0049 0.0164 0.0951*** 0.0506* 
(0.0207) (0.0184) (0.0318) (0.0302) (0.0356) (0.0307) 
Migrants 
-0.0005 -0.0001 0.0013** 0.0014** -0.0001 -0.0004 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Se
ct
or
- s
pe
ci
fi
c 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
us
ed
 in
 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
co
un
tr
ie
s Exit in the sector t-1 
-0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0016 0.0353*** 0.0031 0.0152 
(0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0116) (0.0029) (0.0182) 
Incumbents in the sector 
-0.0008*** -0.0011 0.0005 -0.0057* -0.0032*** -0.0161*** 
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0033) (0.0009) (0.0055) 
Industrial tradition in the 
sector 
-0.0006*** 0.0017*** 0.0001 0.0114*** 0.0031*** 0.0092** 
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0035) (0.0006) (0.0046) 
Wages in the sector 
-0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 fo
r 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
Non-registered/registered 
 0.9801***  -0.8592  -2.1970** 
 (0.3652)  (0.9524)  (0.9893) 
Non-registered/registered2 
 -0.3497***  0.2510  1.2528** 
 (0.1278)  (0.4881)  (0.5451) 
Poverty 
 -0.0365**  0.0017  -0.0266 
 (0.0148)  (0.0289)  (0.0365) 
Poverty2 
 0.0007*  -0.0005  -0.0001 
 (0.0004)  (0.0010)  (0.0012) 
Employment variation in 
the sector 
 -0.0128***  -0.0016  -0.0041 
 (0.0029)  (0.0023)  (0.0028) 
C
or
e-
pe
ri
ph
er
y 
pa
tt
er
n 
Density x rich dummy 
 1.2746***  1.4873***  1.1186*** 
 (0.3090)  (0.3274)  (0.1660) 
Incumbents in other sectors 
x rich dummy 
 -0.0021  -0.0010  -0.0022*** 
 (0.0016)  (0.0009)  (0.0006) 
Incumbents in the sector x 
rich dummy 
 0.0009  0.0062*  0.0153*** 
 (0.0009)  (0.0033)  (0.0056) 
Industrial tradition in the 
sector x rich dummy 
 -0.0019***  -0.0120***  -0.0082* 
 (0.0006)  (0.0036)  (0.0046) 
Exit in other sectors t-1 x rich 
dummy 
 -0.0100**  0.0077***  -0.0036 
 (0.0039)  (0.0030)  (0.0029) 
Exit in the sector t-1 x rich 
dummy 
 0.0019  -0.0377***  -0.0147 
 (0.0017)  (0.0117)  (0.0185) 
  AIC 884.57 1207.37 913.67 880.80 735.47 682.64 
  LR Test 172.37*** 448.47*** 98.57*** 273.46*** 205.53*** 5107.27*** 
  Hausman 142.67*** 10.82 (a) 0.93 8.80 27.74* 
  Pearson ratio 1,85 1,42 1,12 0,95 0,98 0,92 
Observations: 144. In high tech industry the number of observations is 138 in FE models.  Standard errors in brackets. Asterisks indicate the 
statistical significance of the coefficient: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1.  
Year dummy variables are included in all the specifications. (a) Negative unreported statistic found.  
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Variables that proxy for the singularities of Argentina as a developing country are highly 
significant in low-tech industries. In particular, the negative sign of the poverty variable is 
consistent with lower purchasing power and less resources available for entrepreneurs in 
poor areas. Also, the positive effect of the squared term suggests that high levels of poverty 
spur the creation of (possibly small) firms with low entry barriers. The impact of the 
informal economy is also non linear. A small informal economy encourages entry by either 
pushing people towards entrepreneurship or providing the opportunity of sub-contracting 
activities. However, when the size of the informal sector grows too much, the competition 
with the informal firms may impede the entry of formal ventures12. In addition, as 
employment in the sector increases, less entries are expected, which suggests that the 
increased demand is satisfied through the usage of idle capacity rather than by new firm 
formation.  
The advantages derived from agglomeration effects seem to be particularly strong in 
central regions, where a higher population density encourages entry even more than in the 
periphery. In addition, past incumbents and the number of exits in other sectors have 
opposite effects in core and peripheral provinces. Past incumbents foster start ups only in 
lagged regions, while the opposite is true for central provinces. As for the number of exits 
in other sectors, its negative sign in core regions reflects negative expectations about the 
evolution of economic activity, but in the periphery exerts a positive effect. 
Most of the determinants considered in developed countries are not statistically significant 
in medium tech industries. Only the density and the number of people coming from other 
provinces enhance start ups, while the density squared prevents them. Interestingly, there 
are many variables that show opposite effects in the core and the periphery, a detail that is 
missing in specifications that do not distinguish between both groups of provinces and thus 
overlap the positive/negative effects. In particular, in peripheral regions previous exit in 
the same sector exerts a replacement effect while it seems to proxy for the evolution of 
economic activity in the core. Similarly, past incumbents foster start ups in lagged regions, 
while the opposite is true in central regions (as in low tech activities). Agglomeration 
effects are stronger in rich provinces and they are driven by the concentration of both 
individuals and incumbent firms in the same sector. Incumbents, on the other hand, 
negatively impact entry in the periphery. Lastly, none of the variables accounting for the 
specificities of developing countries exert a significant impact. 
As for high-tech industries, there are also important (dis)agglomeration effects both for 
individuals and current and past incumbents. In these industries, however, agglomeration 
effects emerge from the concentration of firms in other sectors rather than firms in the 
same sector (which discourages entry). This points to the existence of urbanization 
economies, which is consistent with empirical evidence for developed countries 
(Henderson et al., 1995). A higher share of private employment also impacts positively on 
entry in this sector, while negative expectations about the economic activity impacts 
negatively.  
                                                 
12 A higher informal sector may also reflect the lack of government controls in certain provinces, which 
may discourage entrepreneurs for founding a formal firm. 
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The statistical significance of these agglomeration and employment variables remains 
largely unaffected in the model specification that accounts for the core-periphery pattern. 
However, many other factors are now relevant, such as the level of wages in the sector and 
the industrial diversity, which have a positive effect on this kind of start ups, and the share 
of SMEs, which has a negative impact. As in the other sectors considered, many variables 
have differential effects in core and peripheral areas. This is the case of the number of 
incumbents in the same or other sectors as well as the industrial tradition. Once again, 
agglomeration effects are more pronounced in core regions, and they are related to the 
concentration of both population and firms in the same sector. Notably, the importance of 
localization economies grows as the level of technological intensity increases. The core-
periphery pattern is explained in this case by the incumbents in the same sector, the total 
number of incumbents and the industrial tradition. All these variables have opposite effects 
in central and non central regions. 
As for the variables that are typical of developing countries´ studies, there is a significant 
impact of the size of the informal economy, which is opposite to the one found for low 
tech activities. This means that, as the informal economy grows, less entries in high tech 
activities are expected, but when it grows too much, the informal sector has a positive 
effect. The poverty level and the usage of idle capacity have no significant impact on high 
tech entries. 
Table 6 shows analogous results for firm exit. Once again, results for firm exit in low tech 
activities (which account for 68% of total exits) are consistent with those found in previous 
studies for aggregated exit (Calá et al., 2015b). In particular, previous entrants in the sector 
generate a replacement effect in peripheral regions but they prevent exit in the core. This 
suggests that the revolving door is more intense in poorer regions, and the (presumably) 
shorter survival is possibly related to the small market size in these lagged regions. Entries 
in the other sectors also have opposite effects in both groups of provinces: the effect is 
positive in the core and negative in the periphery, where previous entry may proxy for the 
expectations about the evolution of regional manufacturing activity. Likewise, the effect of 
the industrial tradition in the same sector is positive in the periphery and negative in the 
core. In addition, we find a negative effect of the degree of industrial concentration and the 
market growth on exit, as well as a positive impact of the educational level of the 
workforce. The latter may be related to a tougher competition in areas with higher levels of 
human capital.  
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Table 6. Determinants of firm exit by group of industries 
  Low tech Medium tech High tech 
  [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] 
  Poisson RE Poisson RE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson RE Poisson RE 
R
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n-
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ev
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ed
 c
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es
 Employment variation 
-0.0084 0.0003 -0.0083 -0.0052 -0.0135 0.0063 
(0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0179) (0.0168) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.0172* -0.0034 -0.0247 -0.0187 0.0260 0.0300 
(0.0098) (0.0102) (0.0251) (0.0283) (0.0255) (0.0212) 
Primary education 
-0.0006** -0.0004 0.0020* 0.0015 -0.0016** -0.0015*** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Secondary education 
-0.0000 0.0009** -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0008 0.0007 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0007) 
University education 
0.0007* 0.0007* -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0011 0.0013* 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
HH index 
-0.0030 -0.0112** 0.0202 -0.0033 -0.0027 -0.0284*** 
(0.0066) (0.0055) (0.0247) (0.0406) (0.0128) (0.0099) 
SMEs 
-0.0070 -0.0072 0.0818*** 0.0923*** 0.0280 0.0036 
(0.0098) (0.0090) (0.0292) (0.0347) (0.0224) (0.0180) 
Entry in other sectors t-1 
0.0002 -0.0111*** 0.0004 0.0014 -0.0006 0.0009 
(0.0003) (0.0039) (0.0006) (0.0039) (0.0005) (0.0040) 
Density 
0.5842*** 0.5945*** -2.6954 -7.1567 0.5644** 0.3969** 
(0.1387) (0.1175) (7.1660) (8.2045) (0.2605) (0.1979) 
Density2 
-0.0727*** -0.1018*** 0.8084 0.5324 -0.0945*** -0.1346*** 
(0.0160) (0.0149) (0.7046) (1.0326) (0.0311) (0.0148) 
Incumbents in other 
sectors 
-0.0001 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0035 0.0011*** 0.0029*** 
(0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0041) (0.0003) (0.0008) 
Se
ct
or
- s
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c 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
us
ed
 in
 
de
ve
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pe
d 
co
un
tr
ie
s Entry in the sector t-1 
-0.0004** 0.0057*** -0.0014 0.0215 0.0017 0.0164 
(0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0137) (0.0021) (0.0213) 
Incumbents in the sector 
0.0006*** -0.0001 0.0009 -0.0259** -0.0030*** -0.0317*** 
(0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0111) (0.0010) (0.0072) 
Industrial tradition in the 
sector 
0.0003*** 0.0012** 0.0000 -0.0145 0.0025*** 0.0237*** 
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0118) (0.0006) (0.0063) 
Wages in the sector 
-0.0000 0.0000 0.0004** 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 fo
r 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 
co
un
tr
ie
s Non-registered/registered 
  -0.7609**   0.0321   -0.6109 
  (0.3716)   (1.3403)   (1.0707) 
Non-
registered/registered2 
  0.2633**   0.3837   0.5845 
  (0.1307)   (0.6865)   (0.5986) 
Employment variation in 
the sector 
  -0.0076**   -0.0054   -0.0017 
  (0.0038)   (0.0041)   (0.0027) 
C
or
e-
pe
ri
ph
er
y 
pa
tt
er
n 
Density x rich dummy 
  0.9750***   8.4807   1.3593*** 
  (0.2539)   (9.0378)   (0.1866) 
Incumbents in other 
sectors x rich dummy 
  -0.0010   -0.0054   -0.0032*** 
  (0.0013)   (0.0042)   (0.0008) 
Incumbents in the sector 
x rich dummy 
  0.0001   0.0268**   0.0319*** 
  (0.0008)   (0.0113)   (0.0073) 
Industrial tradition in the 
sector x rich dummy 
  -0.0014***   0.0130   -0.0232*** 
  (0.0005)   (0.0118)   (0.0062) 
Entry in other sectors t-1 x 
rich dummy 
  0.0116***   -0.0001   -0.0006 
  (0.0039)   (0.0038)   (0.0040) 
Entry in the sector t-1 x 
rich dummy 
  -0.0057***   -0.0217   -0.0160 
  (0.0019)   (0.0138)   (0.0213) 
                
  AIC 1063.37 1041.07 511.04 515.48 641.38 608.10 
  LR Test 1350.86*** 1794.58*** 511.45*** 522.85*** 375.29*** 3421.43*** 
  Hausman 19.25* 20.51 35.22*** 110.87*** 14.70 19.30 
  Pearson ratio 1,25 1,07 0,86 0,83 0,88 0,86 
 
Observations: 144. Standard errors in brackets. Asterisks indicate the statistical significance of the coefficient: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-
value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1. Year dummy variables are included in all the specifications.  
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Dense areas expel firms out of the market, although this effect is reversed in highly dense 
areas. This outcome may result from competition effects as well as from differences within 
a single province between dense areas specialized in services (especially public services) 
and less populated industrial regions, where manufacturing activity is more easily retained. 
In any case, this topic deserves further attention in future research. Notably, the 
disagglomeration effect is more pronounced in core regions, where population density 
fosters exit even more than in the rest of the country.  
Lastly, the informal economy impacts on low tech exit much in the same way as it does to 
the whole manufacturing (Calá et al., 2015b). Although a small informal economy prevents 
exit, it fosters closures when it grows beyond a certain level. The initial negative effect may 
be related to the lower costs and/or the higher flexibility that are inherent to the informal 
hiring, while a positive impact is expected when formal firms have to compete for 
resources or market access with informal firms. Remarkably, these links between the 
formal and the informal sector seem to be relevant only in low tech industries.  
As in the entry process, exits in medium tech sectors are far less systematic than in the 
other sectors13. There is a positive effect of nominal wages and the share of SMEs, which 
reflects the so called liability of smallness (Strotmann, 2007). When we incorporate variables 
typical for developing countries, however, we only find a competition effect driven by 
incumbents in the core. The opposite effect is found in the periphery, where localization 
economies seem to be more important.  
Exits in high tech industries are largely driven by agglomeration diseconomies that emerge 
from population density and the number of incumbent firms in the other sectors. However, 
there are marked differences between the core and the periphery. In the core, incumbents 
in the same sector push firms out of the market (competition effect), whereas in peripheral 
provinces those incumbents induce localization economies that prevent exit. At the same 
time, incumbents in other sectors retain firms in core provinces (which is the expected 
outcome of a dense industrial structure or the existence of urbanization economies), but 
they foster exit in non central regions. Industrial tradition in the sector is also relevant and 
it has the opposite impact in the core (negative) and the periphery (positive). 
 
5. Final remarks 
This paper analyses the determinants of entry and exit in developing countries, taking 
Argentina as a particular case. This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to explain 
regional firm dynamics in a developing economy using both regional- and sectorial- 
specific variables. Our results suggest that firm formation policies and, more generally, 
industrial policies in developing countries should be specifically designed, adapting them -
at least- at three levels.  
                                                 
13 The fact that medium-tech activities probably share certain characteristics with both low- and high-
tech industries makes more difficult to identify entry and exit determinants in this group of  
industries. 
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Firstly, several specificities of developing economies should be taken into account. In the 
case of Argentina, for example, we find a substitution effect between the usage of idle 
capacity and new firm formation, as well as a non linear impact of the poverty level on 
entries. The latter means that the impact of policies simply aimed at promoting new 
business creation may be limited, since reducing the rate of poverty probably requires long-
term measures. Besides, we find a non linear effect of the size of the informal sector, for 
both entry and exit, which is also different for low and high tech sectors. This means that 
the (strong) links between the formal and the informal sector may be extremely complex, 
so that more research is needed in order to understand this relationship.  
Secondly, policy makers ought to consider regional heterogeneity within the country, 
making additional efforts to request results and experiences from all over the national 
territory and not just from central regions. The core-periphery pattern found implies that 
the impact of many variables (replacement/displacement effects, and past and current 
agglomeration economies) is opposite in central and lagged provinces. According to our 
results, for example, promoting high tech entry in lagged regions may be particularly 
difficult, since there are usually not enough related firms to create the conditions required 
for external economies to arise. We also show that the revolving door effect is stronger in 
low tech industries of lagged regions. This casts doubts on the usefulness of entry-
promoting policies that, ultimately, may only cause more exits. 
Finally, policy measures aimed to foster start ups and prevent firm exit may only succeed if 
they take into account the industrial mix of each geographical area. Our results show that 
firm entry and exit in low and high tech industries is explained by different factors. For 
example, indigenous variables from developing countries impact mostly on low tech 
entries and exits. Besides, the core-periphery pattern is relevant for all sectors, which 
suggests that industrial policies should not only address specificities of industrial sectors, 
but particular characteristics of those sectors within the regions.  
Future extensions of this study should test for the equality of the effects of the explanatory 
variables over non local manufacturing firms, as well as over the service sector. Besides, 
further research should analyze the impact of regional firm dynamics on some measures of 
economic performance, such as employment creation or regional innovation. 
 
6. References 
Agarwal, R. and Gort, M. (1996): “The Evolution of Markets and Entry, Exit and Survival 
of Firms”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78: 489-498.  
Allison, P.D and Waterman, R.P. (2002): “Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Regression 
Models”, Sociological Methodology 32: 247-265. 
Álvarez, R. and Görg, H. (2009): “Multinationals and plant exit: Evidence from Chile”, 
International Review of Economics & Finance, 18(1), 45-51. 
Álvarez, R. and Vergara, S. (2010): “Exit in Developing Countries: Economic Reforms 
and Plant Heterogeneity”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 58(3), 537-561. 
 - 23 - 
 
Álvarez, R. and Vergara, S. (2013): “Trade exposure, survival and growth of small and 
medium-size firms”, International Review of Economics & Finance, 25, 185-201. 
Arauzo-Carod, J.M., Manjón-Antolín, M., Martín, M., and Segarra, A. (2007): “Regional 
and sector-specific determinants of industry dynamics and the displacement–replacement 
effects”, Empirica, 34(2), 89-115. 
Armington, C. and Acs, Z.J. (2002):  “The Determinants of Regional Variation in New 
Firm Formation”, Regional Studies, 36 (1): 33-45. 
Ashcroft, B., Love, J.H. and Malloy, E. (1991): “New firm formation in the British 
counties with special reference to Scotland”, Regional Studies, 25: 395–409. 
Audretsch, D.B. (1995a): “Innovation, growth and survival”, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 13 (4): 441-457.    
Audretsch, D.B. (1995b): Innovation and industry evolution. Cambridge, Mass. 
Audretsch, D.B. and Fritsch, M. (1994): “The geography of firm births in Germany”, 
Regional Studies, 28(4): 359–365. 
Audretsch, D.B. and Fritsch, M. (1999): “The industry component of regional new firm 
formation process”, Review of Industrial Organization 15: 239–252. 
Audretsch, D.B. and Keilbach, M. (2005): “Entrepreneurship capital and regional 
growth”, The Annals of Regional Science 39: 457–469. 
Baltagi, B.H. (2005): Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. Wiley, Chichester. 
Bennet, J. (2010): “Informal firms in developing countries: entrepreneurial stepping stone 
or consolation prize?”, Small Business Economics 34: 53–63. 
Berglund, E. and Brännäs, K. (2001): “Plants’ entry and exit in Swedish municipalities”, 
The Annals of Regional Science, 35(3): 431-448. 
Bértola, L. and Ocampo, J.A. (2012): The Economic Development of Latin America since 
Independence, Oxford University Press.  
Bresnahan, T.F. and Reiss, P.C. (1991): “Entry and competition in concentrated markets”, 
Journal of Political Economy, 99(5): 977-1009. 
Brixy, U. and Grotz, R. (2007): “Regional patterns and determinants of birth and survival 
of new firms in Western Germany”, Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 19 (4): 293-
312.  
Bruton, G.D.; Ahlstrom, D. and Obloj, K. (2008): “Entrepreneurship in emerging 
economies: Where are we today and where should the research go in the future”, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 32 (1): 1–14. 
Buss, T.F. and Lin, X. (1990): “Business survival in rural America: A three-state study”, 
Growth and Change, 21, 1–8 
Calá, C.D.; Manjón-Antolín, M. and Arauzo-Carod, J.M. (2015a): “Regional 
Determinants of Firm Entry in a Developing Country”, Papers in Regional Science 
(forthcoming). 
Calá, C.D., Arauzo-Carod, J.M. and Manjón-Antolín, M. (2015b): “The Determinants of 
Exit in a Developing Country: Core and Peripheral Regions”, The Annals of Regional Science 
(forthcoming). 
 - 24 - 
 
Cameron, A.C. and Trivedi, P.K (1998): Regression Analysis of Count Data, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Cameron, A.C. and Trivedi, P.K (2009): Microeconometrics Using Stata, Stata Press. 
Carree M. and Thurik R. (1996): “Entry and exit in retailing: incentives, barriers, 
displacement and replacement”, Review of Industrial Organization 11(2): 155-172. 
Carree, M.; Santarelli, S. and Verheul, I. (2008): “Firm entry and exit in Italian provinces 
and the relation-ship with unemployment”, International Entrepreneurship Management 
Journal 4: 171–186. 
Carree, M.; Verhuel, I.; Santarelli, E. (2011): “Sectoral patterns of firm exit in Italian 
provinces”, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 21: 499-517. 
Carreira, C. and Teixeira, P. (2011): “The shadow of death: analysing the pre-exit 
productivity of Portuguese manufacturing firms”, Small Business Economics 36: 337–351. 
Cassiolato, J.E., Pagola, C.B. and Lastres, H.M. (2009): “Technical Change and Structural 
Inequalities: Converging Approaches to Problems of Underdevelopment”. In: Techno-
Economic Paradigms: Essays in Honour of Carlota Perez. Drechsler, W.J., Kattel, R. and 
Reinert, E.S. (Eds.) Anthem Press. 
Davidsson, P., Lindmark, L. and Olofsson, Ch. (1994): “New firm formation and regional 
development in Sweden”, Regional Studies 28 (4): 395-410.  
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) (2007): Progreso 
técnico y cambio estructural en América Latina y el Caribe. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 
Documentos de proyectos, n. 136. 
Eslava, M.; Haltiwanger, J.C.; Kugler, A.D. and Kugler, M. (2006): “Plant turnover and 
structural reforms in Colombia”, IMF Staff Papers, 53, 58–75.   
Feldman, M.P. (1994): The geography of innovation (Vol. 2). Springer. 
Forsyth, G.D. (2005): “A note on small business survival in rural areas: The case of 
Washington State”, Growth and change, 36, 428–440. 
Fotopoulos, G. and Spence, N. (1998): “Accounting for Net Entry into Greek 
Manufacturing by Establishments of Varying Size”, Small Business Economics 11: 125–144. 
Fotopoulos, G., and Spence, N. (1999): “Spatial variations in new manufacturing plant 
openings: some empirical evidence from Greece”, Regional Studies 33 (3): 219-29. 
Fritsch, M. and Falck, O. (2007): “New Business Formation by Industry over Space and 
Time: A Multidimensional Analysis”, Regional Studies 41 (2): 157–172.  
Fritsch, M.; Brixy, U. and Falck, O. (2006): “The effect of industry, region, and time on 
new business survival”, Review of Industrial Organization 28: 285-306. 
Garofoli, G. (1994): “New firm formation and regional development: The Italian case”, 
Regional Studies 28 (4): 381-393. 
Ghani, E.; Kerr, W.; and O'connell, S. (2014): “Spatial determinants of entrepreneurship 
in India”, Regional Studies, 48(6), 1071-1089. 
Günalp, B. and Cilasun, S.M. (2006): “Determinants of Entry in Turkish Manufacturing 
Industries”, Small Business Economics, 27, 275–287. 
 - 25 - 
 
Hamilton, RT. and Harper, DA. (1994): “The entrepreneur in Theory and Practice”, 
Journal of Economic Studies, 21 (6):3-18. 
Hart, M. and Gudgin, G. (1994): “Spatial Variations in New Firm Formation in the 
Republic of Ireland, 1980-1990”, Regional Studies 28(4): 367-380. 
Hausman, J.; Hall, BH. and Griliches, Z. (1984): “Econometric Models for Count Data 
with an Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship”, Econometrica, 52 (4): 909-938. 
Henderson, V.; Kuncoro, A. and Turner, M. (1995): “Industrial Development in Cities”, 
The Journal of Political Economy, 103(5): 1067-1090.   
Huiban, J.P. (2011): “The spatial demography of new plants: urban creation and rural 
survival”, Small Business Economics, 37(1), 73-86. 
INDEC (2005): Anuario Estadístico de la República Argentina. Buenos Aires, INDEC. 
Kantis, H.; Angelelli, P. and Moori Koening, V. (2005): Developing Entrepreneurship: 
Experience in Latin America and Worldwide. Inter-American Development Bank, NW. 
Katz, J. and Bernat, G. (2011): “Exit-entry, productivity growth and structural change in 
response to changes in macroeconomic policy: evidence from Argentina”, Innovation and 
Development, 1(2), 227-244. 
Katz, J. and Stumpo, G. (2001): “Regímenes sectoriales, productividad y competitividad 
internacional”, Revista de la CEPAL, 75: 137-159. 
Keeble, D. and Walker, S. (1994): “New Firms, Small Firms and Dead Firms: Spatial 
Patterns and Determinants in the United Kingdom”, Regional Studies 28 (4): 411-427. 
Kosacoff, B. and Ramos, A. (1999): “El debate sobre política industrial”, Revista de la 
CEPAL 68: 35-60. 
Krugman, P. (1991): “Increasing returns and economic geography”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 99: 483-499. 
Lay, T.J. (2003): “The Determinants of and Interaction between Entry and Exit in 
Taiwan´s manufacturing”, Small Business Economics, 20, 319-334. 
Littunen, H.; Storhammar, E. and Nenonen, T. (1998): “The survival of firms over the 
critical first 3 years and the local environment”, Entrepreneurship & Regional Development 10 
(3): 189-202. 
López, R.A. (2006): “Imports of intermediate inputs and plant survival”, Economic Letters, 
92(1), 58-62. 
MTEYSS (2007): “La creación de empresas durante la etapa post convertibilidad (2003-
2005): Impacto sobre el empleo asalariado registrado”. In: Salarios, empresas y empleo 
2003-2006, Series Trabajo, ocupación y empleo, nº 5. National Ministry of Labour, 
Employment and Social Security. January.  
Naudé, W.; Gries, T.; Wood, E. and Meintjies, A. (2008): “Regional determinants of 
entrepreneurial start-ups in a developing country”, Entrepreneurship & Regional Development: 
An International Journal, 20(2), 111-124. 
Nurmi, S. (2006): “Sectoral differences in plant start-up size in the Finnish economy”, 
Small Business Economics, 26(1): 39-60. 
 - 26 - 
 
Nyström, K. (2007): “An industry disaggregated analysis of the determinants of regional 
entry and exit”, Annals of Regional Science 41: 877–896. 
Ocampo, J.A., Rada, C. and Taylor, L. (2009): Growth and Policy in Developing Countries: A 
Structuralist Approach, New York, Oxford University Press. 
Ozturk, S. and Kilic, C. (2012): “Patterns and determinants of entry and exit in Turkish 
manufacturing industries”, International Journal of Arts and Commerce, 1(5), 107-118.         
Reynolds, P. (1994): “Autonomous firm dynamics and economic growth in the United 
States, 1986–1990”, Regional Studies, 28(4), 429-442. 
Reynolds, P.; Storey, D.J. and Westhead, P. (1994): “Cross-national comparisons of the 
variation in new firm formation rates”, Regional Studies 28 (4): 443–456. 
Rocha, H.O. and Sternberg, R. (2005): “Entrepreneurship: The Role of Clusters 
Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Evidence from Germany”, Small Business Economics 
24: 267-292. 
Santarelli, E. and Tran, H.T. (2012): “Growth of Incumbent Firms and Entrepreneurship 
in Vietnam”, Growth and Change, 43(4), 638–666. 
Santarelli, E.; Carree, M. and Verheul, I. (2009): “Unemployment and Firm Entry and 
Exit: An Update on a Controversial Relationship”, Regional Studies 43 (8): 1061-1073. 
Schneider, F. (2005): “Shadow economies around the world: what do we really know?”, 
European Journal of Political Economy, 21, 598–642. 
Scott, A.J. and Storper, M. (2007); “Regions, globalization, development”, Regional studies, 
41(S1): S191-S205. 
Shapero, A. (1983): New business formation. Enschede. 
Spilling, O.R. (1996): “Regional variation of new firm formation: The Norwegian case”, 
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 8: 217-43.  
Stiglitz, J. (1998): “Towards a New Paradigm for Development: Strategies, Policies, and 
Processes”. Given as the 1998 Prebisch Lecture at UNCTAD, Geneva, October 19. 
Strotmann, H. (2007): “Entrepreneurial survival”, Small Business Economics, 28(1): 87-104. 
Sunkel O. (1978): “La dependencia y la heterogeneidad estructural”, Trimestre Económico, 
45 (1): 3-20 México, D.F. 
Sutaria, V. and Hicks, D.A. (2004): “New firm formation: Dynamics and determinants”, 
Annals of Regional Science, 38: 241-262. 
Tamásy, C. and Le Heron, R. (2008): “The Geography of Firm Formation in New 
Zealand”, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 99 (1): 37-52. 
Vernon, R. (1966): “International investment and international trade in the product cycle”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 41: 191-207. 
Wang, S. (2006): “Determinants of New Firm Formation in Taiwan”, Small Business 
Economics, 27, 313–321. 
Wilson, D. and Purushothaman, R. (2006): “Dreaming with BRICs: the path to 2050”. In 
S. Jain (Ed.). Emerging Economies and the Transformation of International Business. Brazil, 
Russia, India and China. (Ch. 1.) Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.  
 - 27 - 
 
Appendix 1. Industry classification 
 Year 2008 
Group Code Industry % firms %employees 
Low 
tech 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 22,6% 26,6% 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 0,0% 0,4% 
17 Manufacture of textiles 4,9% 5,5% 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of 
fur 6,8% 4,5% 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 3,0% 3,3% 
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 5,9% 3,2% 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 6,9% 4,8% 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 3,3% 3,4% 
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 5,7% 3,4% 
37 Recycling 0,3% 0,3% 
                              Total Low Tech 59,4% 55,4% 
Medium 
tech 
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 1,5% 2,5% 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 0,1% 0,5% 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 5,3% 5,4% 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 2,1% 3,5% 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 14,4% 8,7% 
                              Total Medium Tech 23,4% 20,6% 
High 
tech 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4,1% 7,0% 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 5,8% 5,9% 
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing 
machinery 0,3% 0,3% 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 1,9% 1,9% 
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 0,2% 0,4% 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 1,0% 0,7% 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2,8% 6,7% 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0,8% 1,0% 
                               Total High Tech 16,9% 23,9% 
Note: Data = Entry + Incumbent – Exit.  
 
Source: author from ISIC, rev. 3; EBDO data and Katz and Bernat (2011). 
 
 
 
